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2	UNITED STATES	BANKRUPTCY COURT
3	DISTRICT	OF DELAWARE
4	IN RE:	. Chapter 11
5	Owens Corning. et al.,	•
6	Debtor(s).	. Bankruptcy #00-03837 (JKF)
7		
8	Wilmington, DE February 25, 2002 4:00 p.m.	
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10	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH K. FITZGERALD UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE	
11	UNITED STATES	BANAROPICI UUDGE
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(Proceeding in progress)

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MR. PERNICK: Okay. Moving back to the agenda, I think I'd like to take everything in order except Mr. Eckstein and I had spoken about exclusivity and since it's related to the Intercreditor Report I think -- and that's basically their objection ties into that Intercreditor status and what the Court might do on that, I think we'll take those together, but we'll probably will ask the Court if we can have that Intercreditor Status Report in discussion, and then move after that to exclusivity at the end of that --

THE COURT: That's okay.

MR. PERNICK: -- just 'cause it seemed to make sense.

I don't know if Mr. Eckstein agrees with that particular

order, but he can -- maybe when we get to the Intercreditor

we'll deal with all that.

Starting with Agenda Item #1 was the Motion of the IRS for Relief from the Automatic Stay to Exercise its Set-up Rights, and on consent of the parties, we have adjourned that until April 22nd at 1:00. And we understand that's in Pittsburgh on April 22nd.

THE COURT: Yes. Are you coming to Pittsburgh? I will be in Pittsburgh.

MR. PERNICK: I think it depends on what ends up being on, but if there are pretty substantive matters on, I think we probably will. If we think it's going to be a quick

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hearing, I think we probably won't.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PERNICK: Moving to Agenda Item #2, and I don't know if you want to, if you've had a chance to review Items 2 through, I think it's 7 or 8 --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PERNICK: It's 7. If you want me to go through those --

THE COURT: I am waiting for the orders to be entered. I have not signed those orders yet. The agenda binder that I was presented with did not have the motions or the orders in. So they may be here somewhere, but I don't physically have them.

MR PERNICK: I have duplicates with me, actually. I'll be happy to --

THE COURT: You signed them? You stamped them for me?

(The Judge confers with the clerk)

THE COURT: I've talked to Rachel, but I haven't seen the order appearing in that hotel. So okay.

MR. PERNICK: All right. So that's Item -- just so
I've read the Courtroom notes, if they don't have an agenda in
front of them, that's Item #2, which is the Environmental
Settlement with the State of Ohio. Item #3, which is the
Motion for Leave to File Proof of Claim Out of Time, by

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Crossroads Distribution: Item #4, Authorizing the
Discontinuance of the Y2K Insurance Litigation: Item #5, which
is the Modification of the Automatic Stay to Effectuate a Setoff between Specialty Products and Insulation Co., and the
Debtor: #6 is Exterior Systems' Motion to Enter into an Asset
Purchase Agreement. That's regarding Morin -- M-O-R-I-N. And
#7 is Exterior's Motion to Assume and Assign an Equipment
Lease Agreement with American Equipment Leasing.

That takes us up to Item #8, which you've got a Certificate of No Objection on, but all of the parties have not -- they had signed off, but had not actually signed the final CMO, and I have that with me today.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine, I'll take it.

MR. PERNICK: And I have an original and an extra
copy, if I can.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PERNICK: I guess I should have started out by saying that we're pleased to actually to have a final CMO in this case, and we view it as a form book that everybody in the Courtroom should get. And anybody who can understand every word in there should be elevated to some senior status. It is quite a work of art.

(Laughter)

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THE COURT: My question was, who's going to interpret this, if there are any issues that arise?

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It'll be binding,

MR. PERNICK: Oh, the Debtors are.
too.

(Laughter)

THE COURT: Do you want a copy of this back?

MR. PERNICK: Yes, please.

THE COURT: I take it there'll have been no changes - I should have asked that before I signed it -- from the
draft that I was presented except --

MR. PERNICK: Actually, that's -- thank you for raising that. Attached to your copy I believe is a red line, or if not, I have it here, that shows you the changes. The only changes were -- when we filed it, we anticipated caps on certain of those numbers, but we did not -- the financial advisors had not completed meeting yet -- so we filed it with no caps, with the understanding that we negotiate those and put them in. And those are the changes that are in there now.

THE COURT: All right. And no one has an objection to that?

MR. PERNICK: Not that I know of. I think everybody has signed off, and everybody has signed the document.

THE COURT: All right. And that's the only change?

MR. PERNICK: There are several of them, but yes, but that's the category of changes.

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. That order is entered.

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MR PERNICK: Thank you.

THE COURT: On #9, I signed the modified order on #9 on February the 12th. I don't know where it is, I don't know why it's not docketed, and I don't know why you don't have it, but I did sign it. However, I did modify it.

MR. PERNICK: Okay.

THE COURT: So, I have a copy in Pittsburgh. I had one faxed here Friday I think, but apparently it's missing, so I will have another one faxed --

MR. PERNICK: Okay.

THE COURT: -- and hopefully, you will get it.

MR. PERNICK: Okay, yeah. If we can just - we'll get that if you want us to copy it, and hand copies out, we'll be happy to do that for the Court.

THE COURT: All right.

(Pause in proceedings)

MR. PERNICK: Now, the next matter is Baron & Budd's Motion for Relief from Stay, and as we recall, the status of that was that we were to attempt to reach a consensual order on that, and if we couldn't, we were going to come to Court, and Your Honor, I think, was either going to tell us that you were reserving judgment, or you were going to issue your ruling. So I'm not sure that there's more argument on that. I don't know what people have to say about that, or whether you want them to say anything, but that's the status of it as

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of now, and Mr. Podesta from the Debtor is here. THE COURT: Okay. I thought from the consent letter 2 that you had resolved this, no? 3 MR. PERNICK: We did not resolve it, no. 4 apologize. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Oh -- not in consent. 6 MR. PERNICK: Right. 7 THE COURT: I can't read, I apologize. I thought it 8 said the parties will be --9 MR. PERNICK: No. 10 THE COURT: Okay. 11 MR. PERNICK: Unfortunately, that there are two 12 diametrically different views of where this should go, so it 13 was not resolved. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Podesta? 15 MR. PODESTA: Your Honor, I don't want to present any 16 argument, but as part of the parties' efforts to reach a 17 settlement, we did clarify somewhat the status of certain of 18 the Plaintiffs, and I thought it would be useful to put it on 19 the record in as neutral a manner as I can. 20 You'll recall that the principle amount of the Fiberboard 21 Escrow Account was \$44 million and the principle amount of the 22 OC Escrow Account was \$66 million as originally established. 23 Under the agreement, Baron & Budd was permitted to draw down 24

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from the escrow account, with respect to those of their

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clients who received written approval from OC or Fiberboard, if that particular client had met the requirements of the agreement.

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Prior to the petition date, Fiberboard issued approvals with respect to 5,372 Plaintiffs, formal written approvals under Part 12 of the Settlement Agreement. Prior to the Petition, some \$15,700,000 was paid to those Plaintiffs. those 5,372 Fiberboard Plaintiffs were to receive their second and third installments, those second and third installments would completely consume, with a substantial amount left over in potential further claims, the full amount of the 44 million.

> THE COURT: I'm sorry. It would consume --

MR. PODESTA: Yes. The second and third installments to those 5,372 Plaintiffs would consume the full amount of the remaining principle of the escrow, so that in paying those installments, the entire 44 million principle amount of the escrow would be gone. The 28,200,000 or so that is now in principle in the escrow would be consumed by those payments alone.

With respect to Owens Corning, the situation is somewhat Prior to the petition date, 3,511 Plaintiffs received formal written approval under the agreement, and they were paid pre-petition some 17,200,000 which would leave in the escrow accounts, in principle, in rough round numbers,

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48,800,000. Completing the second and third installment payments to those 3,511 individuals would involve the payment of slightly over \$39 million more, such that there would be approximately \$7,400,000 remaining in the escrow accounts, in principle, for OC after those individuals were fully paid.

Now, there is one other category of claimants that I think I should — that I think Baron & Budd and we were able to identify, and I would just set out the facts as to them to the Court. These are individuals as to whom OC or Fiberboard internally determined pre-petitioned, that they had met the preconditions to payment under the agreement, but that they — these individuals were not the recipients of formal notices of approval per se, pursuant to Part 12 of the contract.

In the Fiberboard case, there were 946 Plaintiffs, and -who if they were paid all their money would receive
\$11,210,000. Of course, the Fiberboard escrow, as I've
already pointed out, the principle amount would be consumed
simply by those who had already received their full -- have
received full, formal written approval under Part 12.

with respect to Owens Corning, where there is some seven — if you pay all those who receive the formal written approval there would be some 7,400,000 left in principle amount, there are 646 who received internal approval from OC, but not formal written approval prior to the petition date. And those 646, if they were paid in full their three

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installments, they would consume the remaining principle amount of the OC account. And I pass those facts along without argument.

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Okay. Well, I don't known that I can do much more to try to articulate my findings on the record. think I was pretty specific about what I would conclude. anybody wish to address what I have already stated on record, essentially with respect to these Plaintiffs who were identified and received a distribution through the petition, it seems to me that either through an assumption of the contract, if this were deemed to be an executory contract, or through whatever damage they're going to be able to prove, since they have negotiated the settlement agreement and issued a release, that there is fair consideration for the payment, they're entitled to the payment, and they should be paid. Now the Debtor has an issue as to whether that payment should be made now or at planned confirmation. Quite frankly, I'm not sure why we need to hold that up 'til planned confirmation, when I think it's pretty clear that they're entitled to be paid. On that issue, I'm somewhat less adamant, I suppose, and can be probably swayed your way, but it seems to me that those Plaintiffs will have allowed claims in the amount of the settlement. There is consideration, I do not think there are fraudulent conveyances involved to the extent that releases have been issued. I don't see any defense to the payment, and

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I think they need to be paid.

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With respect to the category that was just identified by Mr. Podesta, Plaintiffs who may have internally asked to the two Debtors that identify as entitled to receive payments, but who were not notified in writing that the settlements would be approved, it seems to me that as to those, they are not in any better a position, because no formal releases have been executed by those parties than any other Plaintiff in the case. And as a result, they are not entitled to payment at this time. If they choose to go forward with their settlement proposals, I suppose their claims can be limited to that amount, if the debtor decides at some point through the plan to assume those settlement agreements as executory contracts. To the extent the Debtor does not decide to do that, and therefore pay the amounts that would be due at least at planned confirmation, they have the entitlement to file their full claims in full, because there is not an approved settlement of those claims.

So one way or the other, I think there's an issue out there to be adjudicated with respect to them, and I think the Debtor gets the first bite at attempting to decide what to do with them. With respect to everybody else, as to whom the administrative process has not yet gotten to the point where the Debtors even have requests to consider whether the settlements were approved, there is no such {in quotes},

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"executory contract," to be approved, there was no settlement offer, and they're not entitled to payment at this time. And those funds, to the extent there are any left over, have to be rebated back to this estate. Those are, as much as I can, I quess, succinctly put on record today.

MR. PODESTA: Your Honor, two points of clarification. First, I don't believe the Debtors are taking the position that the distribution to these Plaintiffs has to await planned confirmation. We had argued early on that no distributions to these Plaintiffs of the third installment could be made until January 17, 2002, when it was contractually due, but that date has now passed. And secondly, I just want to clarify that when I say that the Debtors had determined internally that these — this other group had met the requirements to the agreement, that included the delivery of releases.

THE COURT: Oh, so they've already delivered releases --

MR. PODESTA: They --

THE COURT: -- and didn't get a distribution.

MR. PODESTA: they -- that's right. They have delivered releases, they've met the medical requirements, they've met product I.D. requirements, but they've not received the formal written notice of approval from the Debtors to Baron & Budd, saying you can release the money

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under the agreement. Rather, it's just, if you look at the Debtor's internal records, they have check marks that these people had met the requirements for medical product I.D. and releases.

THE COURT: Well, I think the problem with that is, that I'm not inclined at this point to say that the Fiberboard entities are different from the Owens Corning entities in that respect. In the event there's no money to pay the Fiberboard, I think the Owens people are probably going to have to wait as well.

To the extent that releases have been delivered though, I still think the law in the Circuit's pretty clear, that any transfer in connection with that is not going to be deemed to be a fraudulent conveyance, i.e., it would have been made with their consideration, given the parameters of — the fact that the release is a contractually bargained for exchange. But I think, on balance, that there was no distribution, and the Debtors still have right to those funds. Until a distribution was made, the debtor still has rights to those funds, and they have to be rebated back to the estate. I don't see another way at this point in time, given the law under which I think we work, to get around that proposition.

So, I think the answer is that the Plaintiffs identified who received a partial distribution who are now entitled to distributions two and three, and who executed releases and

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otherwise got the formal consent of the Debtor, should be paid. All others should not. And any funds in excess of the payments to the class who is entitled to be paid should be rebated back to this estate.

MR. PODESTA: Your Honor, do you want us to submit an order to that?

THE COURT: I think that would be helpful, but does anyone want to be heard on this matter further? I'll give you literally two minutes. Mr. Esserman?

MR. HARRIS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Oh, yes, sir.

MR. HARRIS: Sorry, Your Honor, this Gordon Harris from Davis, Polk & Wardwell, representing the Unsecured Creditors Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to participate via telephone. We understand Your Honor's ruling and legal argument and won't bother the Court anymore with that, although I say, with all respect, that we do disagree, and I believe that it's highly probable that the Committee will want to appeal.

In terms of, I believe Mr. Podesta in the Court was just mentioning a possible order. Certain things Mr. Podesta put on the record, and I believe I understood most of them, I would point out though, that terms of exactly, for lack of a better phrase, I would say, who gets what, pursuant to Your Honor's ruling is somewhat unclear. I think we all know that

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somewhere between, you know, 40 and 45% of this goes out in terms of contingent fees and the like to lawyers, and exactly who else gets -- each of the individuals who gets how much, and what records are kept, there is really nothing in terms this record and the like, so that the Court and indeed and the parties have knowledge of who is purported to get what. So I was merely going to suggest in the terms of the order that your Honor take that measure and perhaps require some specificity.

THE COURT: All right, yes. I think it's appropriate to identify the particular Plaintiffs who get a distribution and the amount of that distribution.

MR. HARRIS: In addition, Your Honor, I infer from the comment you made earlier about findings, whether a payment would be now or later, and inferring from your further comment that you see no great reason to wait until the end of the case, if I am correct, and if the Committee from this do take an appeal, it would be appropriate to appeal now and not have to wait until they do the final calculations, etcetera, for each person. I just raise that as an issue. Perhaps we can get it out of the way.

THE COURT: Okay. It seems to me that with respect to -- well, let's see, I was going to say an allowance of claims, but this is not an allowance of claims proceeding, although I think it's sort of turned into one because in order

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to authorize Baron & Budd to either repay funds sufficient to pay these claims, or else to make a distribution, essentially, I'm allowing these claims in the amount of the settlement. So, maybe the thing to do is simply an order that allows the claims in the amount of settlement and then directs the payment. Is that what you're asking?

MR. HARRIS: Well, I was thinking about one, you know, proceeding was an appeal if the identification was going to take a long time for individuals.

THE COURT: Oh, well the order won't be entered until I get the list that identifies the individuals and states what there's to be -- what amounts they're to get. So, there won't be an order actually entered on record and appealable until I get it from counsel to the Debtor, and I won't get it until they have the list.

MR. HARRIS: Okay, Your Honor. I just wanted to understand these proceedings. Quite honestly, I -- we may be able to expedite this. I don't know if there -- if it makes any sense to -- in the appeals process now, I don't think it's going to change much. The issues on appeal with respect to which GOC individuals are identified --

THE COURT: Well, it may not, but it seems to me that that would provide them with some appropriate notice in any event of the fact that their claims were going to be essentially allowed, and that's the end. Because they've

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executed releases, they have no further claims against this estate. So I think it would be appropriate to send that out by way of notice to those parties anyway.

MR. PODESTA: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Mr. Podesta?

MR. PODESTA: I don't believe it will take us very long to come up with a list of individuals who meet the description of Your Honor's order. These are the individuals who we already paid, and I think we've reached agreement with one or two -- a handful of exceptions of the individuals who have received payment. So it should not take much longer than the time it would take to draft up and reach an agreement on the order to be submitted.

THE COURT: Okay. If the Creditors' Committee -well, you may have a number of disagreements, but is your
primary dispute with my legal analysis, or is your primary
dispute with the payment now, or as opposed to your own plan?

MR. HARRIS: I think it's both, Your Honor. We believe, and this is based on a comment that -- especially at the prior hearing, that the individuals who received the first payment have -- yes, they have claims against the estate, they have no particular claims to these funds. They should be paid like any Creditor with a fixed contract claim out of these funds through the Debtor's funds. And separately, aid should be -- aid at the end of the case, the way every other contract

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creditor is paying, and should abide by the plan.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, you faded out. And should what?

MR. HARRIS: Should abide by the confirmation of the plan.

THE COURT: Oh, okay. Well, as I said earlier, with respect to when the payment's made, that's part of it, frankly, I'm not so wedded to. In terms of the fact that they should be paid from this fund, though, for the reasons that I've attempted to articulate several times in the past, and don't want to go into again to day necessarily, I think they are entitled to a payment from this fund. So to that extent, that the funds are available to these Creditors, it seems to me that there really isn't much of an issue about their entitlement to be paid from them, for the reasons I've already gone into, but as to when the distribution takes place, I think that's a little more difficult decision.

MR. HARRIS: Fine, then maybe we will just wait until we see Mr. Podesta and Baron & Budd's Form of order. And perhaps we can, if the Court wanted to enter and interim order and we'll address the timing of payment later.

THE COURT: Yeah, that may make sense, because I still am hoping that you folks will come to some agreement with respect to this. So when you take a look at the order, I'll give you sufficient time to circulate it around and see

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if you're able to come up with something that you can all live with.

MR. HARRIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Emrich?

MR. EMRICH: Your Honor, just two quick points, one is a clarification. I don't believe Mr. Podesta in his remarks alluded to the investment proceeds, but that's also as I understand it, in the account and consistent with Your Honor's prior findings, it is my understanding that those would revert to the estate.

THE COURT: They should come back to the estate, yes.

MR. EMRICH: {Cough} excuse me. Your Honor, we share Mr. Harris's concerns. We strenuously believe that these payments shouldn't be made in advance of a plan. These claimants do have claims. The Code recognizes that whether these Creditors are secured, unsecured, or otherwise, they get paid under a plan.

And I would point Your Honor to the A.H Robbins 4th Circuit Decision that 832 F.2d 299, 4th Circuit, 1987, where the 4th Circuit overturned a Bankruptcy Court order which had set aside funds in a mass tort context to set up an emergency treatment fund for claimants. And it was predicated solely on the basis, Your Honor, that payments to Creditors ought to be under a plan, and that is what the Code envisions, and there are only a limited set of exceptions to that, and this

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circumstance does not fit in to the necessity of payment doctrine, Your Honor. There is nothing compelling the Debtors to make these payments now.

THE COURT: Yeah, Mr. Emrich, that's what I tried to say. I'm really not so wedded to the concept of when this disbursement has to be. I think the legal issue simply is, are they entitled to be paid from this specific fund as opposed to a general Debtor account, a general Debtor fund. And for the reasons I've gone into, I think they do have a claim to the specific fund that has been identified as to them, because once those Plaintiffs have been identified, and they have, pursuant to their first distribution, under Texas law, I think as to those entities, there is actually an escrow that they then have a right to claim against. As to the entities that have not received that fund and have not been identified, I don't think the same interpretation of the law applies.

So I'm not, as I said earlier, I'm not so married to when the distribution has to be. I think it's a bit inconsistent to say that these are escrowed funds for the benefit of these Plaintiffs, and then also say that they have to wait plan distribution, because to the extent that they're escrowed funds for their benefit, I'm not sure it's property of the estate. But I don't know that we need to get there, so --

MR. EMRICH: I don't want to open the whole argument

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up again, Your Honor, but the point I'd made at the first argument very simply was that even if these were Secured Creditors, which they're not, that the Code envisions that Secured Creditors would be paid under a plan.

envisions though that there are adequate protection remedies for other Secured Creditors, and to the extent that there is a rate which is identified specifically for a group of beneficiaries, under 541, I think there is an issue as to whether those proceeds are property of the estate that would be subject to distribution to any of the Debtor's other Creditors anyway. But, as I said, Mr. Emrich, I'm really not sure it's worth getting into the issue. Holding the disbursement off 'til the end of the case isn't going to cause them any more prejudice, than it's going to cause any other asbestos Plaintiff in the case.

MR. EMRICH: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Esserman?

MR. ESSERMAN: Your Honor, I'd first like to address
-- I'm sorry, for the record, Sandy Esserman of Stutzman and
Bromberg. I'd first like to address that the timing of the
disbursement. It seems to me that if the Plaintiffs have
rights in these funds, there's no need to hold up the
distribution. I think that legal and equitable title has
merged in those Plaintiffs that have complied with Your

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Honor's ruling, and at that point, there is questionable authority in my mind as to whether or not it's estate property at all, and whether or not it should be held up to the end of the case. It seems to me an obvious answer, and that answer is no.

I do want to address Your Honor's prior rulings on the investment income. Mr. Emrich raised that issue, and I assume, pursuant to Your Honor's ruling you're overruling all of my arguments on the investment interest being a property of the Trust or property to which the Plaintiffs would be entitled through escrow or trust or under either theory, and I enunciated some of those at the last hearing.

I will not enunciate those again for Your Honor, but there was an additional argument. I just wanted to make sure the record was clear that, as Your Honor recalls, there are three steps of payment: a zero, zero, two thousand, year 2000 payment; a January 2001 payment; and a January 2002 payment. To the extent the plaintiffs should have been paid their qualified pre-petition and were not paid on those dates, interest income has accrued in those escrow or trust accounts, and there is a question as to if they should have been paid on 01, and if they should have been paid on 02, whose interest would that be? I just wanted to make sure that I understood Your Honor's ruling clearly that any interest that accrued on those funds would have to be returned to the Debtor, versus

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property of those Plaintiffs that have been qualified and didn't get their --

THE COURT: I think the issue is whether they are still treated as Unsecured Creditors, and to the extent that they're still Unsecured Creditors, they're not entitled to interest on their claims. So I don't see why interest on those claims is attributable to those Plaintiffs. I think they are entitled to a disbursement of their settlement amount in full, but I don't see a theory under which interest would be attributable to an Unsecured Claimant.

MR. ESSERMAN: That's fine, Your Honor. I just wanted to make sure that I understood your ruling correctly. The other issue on the disbursement immediately versus a delayed disbursement, obviously there's going to be interest that accrues on this rather substantial amount of money from say, today forward, and to the extent the Plaintiffs were not to receive their money, the interest that accrued on that money that they should have received pursuant to Your Court's order it would seem to me would clearly be property of those Plaintiffs. But nevertheless, I did want to raise those issues also.

THE COURT: Well, yeah, that's the troublesome part of the distribution issue, Mr. Esserman, because if it isn't property of the estate, I mean if this ruling stands for the proposition that now it's known that it's not property of the

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estate, yes, I'm going forward. I think the interest on the funds that would be disbursed to those Plaintiffs would be their interest, because it's their money. To the extent, however, that it's still property of the Estate, but subject to a limited distribution, that is, only particular asbestos Plaintiffs have a claim to this specific fund, even though the property is still property of the Estate, that interest would be attributed to the Estate, not to those Plaintiffs.

so it really comes down to a question of whose property it is, and that's what I said. I don't think this motion compels me to make a determination. I'm not really prepared to make that determination. It just seems to me that these Plaintiffs are entitled to a disbursement from this fund. Based on the way the contract is written, and the fact that the Debtor essentially has the rights to ordinary interest in these accounts, and I understand the argument that the Debtor then has to apply that reversionary interest in specific ways, but nonetheless, the reversionary interest is that of the Debtor.

It seems to me that until the funds are distributed, they're still property of the Estate. It's just that I don't think that the Debtor can do anything under these settlement agreements with those funds of Plaintiffs who've met the qualifications, as I've described on this record, except disbursed money matter. So, on balance, I think it's probably

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132-329-0191

still going to be interest that belongs to the Estate, not to the Debtors -- I'm sorry, not to the Plaintiffs in the case.

MR. ESSERMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: But, that's sort of a gut reaction.

MR. ESSERMAN: Thank you. The only other thing I'd like to address is something Mr. Emrich said about the A.H. Robbins Case. I think that was completely inapposite, and I don't believe that that particular fund was set up prepetition with a particular class of Plaintiffs in mind who had given releases pre-petition, and had been approved for payment pre-petition. I think that situation was totally inapposite.

THE COURT: I don't really see much similarity in the situation of Robbins either Mr. Esserman. My ruling is not based on what happened in Robbins. My ruling is based on my view of the construction of this contract, and what I think the applicable law is with respect to property of the estate and fair consideration paid in exchange for a settlement agreement coupled with a release.

MR. ESSERMAN: Your Honor, we will try and pout together an order for your consideration.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ESSERMAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I know this one may take a while because you're going to have to circulate it to people, but when can I expect this? Two weeks, three weeks?

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732-329-0191

1	MR. PERNICK: I think we certainly want to see the
2	transcript, and I don't know how long that's going to take,
3	but certainly we would want to see the transcript in order to
4	track Your Honor's ruling as accurately as possible.
5	THE COURT: Okay. Six weeks?
6	(Laughter)
7	MR. ESSERMAN: When's the next omnibus hearing?
8	MR. PERNICK: Two weeks, I think.
9	THE COURT: The next omnibus is March the 18th.
10	MR. PERNICK: Now it's March 18th, I can actually
11	answer that
12	THE COURT: Okay.
13	MR. PERNICK: question.
14	(Laughter)
15	MR. PERNICK: The date that Your Honor has open is
16	March 25th, at 9:30 for two hours in Pittsburgh, which I think
17	works. We may need to shorten the timeframes that Your Honor
18	talked about earlier on when things will be due, and when
19	objections will be due, because if you back up from the 25th,
20	you don't make it, but it's close.
21	THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine.
22	MR. PERNICK: Okay, so we'll just fix separate orders
23	for that separate dates for that hearing in the order.
24	THE COURT: So are we not doing hearings in Owens on

March 18th?

MR. PERNICK: Correct.

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THE COURT: We do them all on March 25th.

MR. PERNICK: Unless anybody has a major problem with that, that's what we would suggest. We just move March 18th to March 25th at 9:30 in Pittsburgh and, you know, we'll see whether we need it or not.

THE COURT: Okay. You may not have your transcripts and drafts circulated that soon, though. That's fine --

MR. PERNICK: May not.

THE COURT: -- but I don't know how long it's going to take. I would think that the transcript of the prior proceedings would be of more value than this one.

MR. ESSERMAN: And we've got that transcript of the prior proceeding.

THE COURT: You do?

MR. ESSERMAN: Yes, Your Honor, at least I've got it.

I'll be happy to share it with anyone who would like a copy.

(Laughter)

MR. PERNICK: Why don't we take --

MR. ESSERMAN: I'll send you a copy, Your Honor.

MR. PERNICK: Why don't we take a shot at that Order, and if we can get it in by the next hearing, and if we can't, we'll let the Court know where we are, because we'll have to order the other transcript.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't I do this? I'll say

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that the order is to be entered when brought to Court in Pittsburgh, if it's ready by then, and if not, the parties will tell me a day.

MR. PERNICK: Now I have one other question on this

Form of Order, Your Honor. The ruling that Your Honor just

made obviously has implications for other escrow accounts that

the Debtor has. We may as well just deal with that straight

up, and I've thought about this a little bit, although I may

not have the right thoughts. Obviously the parties to those

escrow agreements are not in Court, so I don't think that

order, just being entered can be binding on them. However, I

do think that the rulings that you made will probably mean

that, you know, it gives you an answer on those other escrows.

I have two suggested ways to handle that. One is to draft the order with those other escrows in mind, and contemplate it and cover by it, and put it out on notice to those parties for them to have it chance to come in and object to it, and put their reasons in. The second would be for us to file some kind of Declaratory Judgment Action, based on that order with respect to the other escrows, to determine what their status is, and the status of those monies. There may be a third way, I don't know.

THE COURT: Well, are the escrow agreements all alike?

MR. PERNICK: No.

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MR. ESSERMAN: They're completely -- Your Honor, Sandy Esserman, for the record, excuse me. They're completely different types of agreements, I believe, between the various parties, and I would strenuously object to any other escrow agreements coming into play within this Order. I think we've teed it up specifically for the Baron & Budd Agreement by motion. The parties have responded specifically to the Baron & Budd Motion. There are other issues which are not present in the other settlement agreements, or agreements, between the parties that are not present in the Baron & Budd Motion, and I think it would be unfair to Baron & Budd to try and tie that into those other agreements into this process.

THE COURT: Why I don't think that is a part of what is applied to them. I think what is wanted to do is to say this is how the Judge ruled in this case, so --

MR. PERNICK: This case does apply.

MR. ESSERMAN: I have no problem with him talking the order and this motion and showing the other parties what Your Honor has ruled and said, "here's the law," and that's fine.

THE COURT: At least until some other Judge changes it, okay?

MR. ESSERMAN: That's fine, but on the other hand, I don't want the entry of this order to be in any way dependant on any other party, other than those in the Courtroom today.

MR. PODESTA: Well, why don't we do this? Why don't

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we --

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MR. HARRIS: Your Honor, Gordon Harris of Unsecured Creditor's Committee. The issue that we agree with Mr. Esserman on. Based on the limited facts we know, the agreements are different, underlying factual circumstances are different. We would strenuously urge the Debtor to do, is commence competing against the others for whatever determination the Debtors want, and we will then will make a determination whether or not -- THE COURT: All right, Mr. Harris, I'm sorry, you're fading out. Let me see and make sure I can restate what you said. Do you agree with Mr. Esserman that these agreements are different and the facts underlying them are different. You'd like the Debtor to start subpleading against the others, and then --

MR. HARRIS: You are correct Your Honor, and we believe that they -- the proceedings will be different and we will want to participate in those. I agree with Mr. Esserman that this order should not address those other agreements.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PERNICK: I was just looking for a mechanism, but I think that's a good suggestion. We'll modify it a little bit. When we get this order, we're going to go to the other parties first, and make a demand for what we want, and if they don't accede to that demand, then we'll bring whatever appropriate action we need to --

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THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. 1 MR. PERNICK: -- rather than just suing. 2 THE COURT: All right. 3 MR. PERNICK: They may see the light when they see 4 5 the order. THE COURT: Okay. 6 Thank you, Your Honor. We will see MR. ESSERMAN: 7 you in Pittsburgh -- a common phrase speaking these days. 8 (Laughter) 9 MR. PERNICK: Your Honor, the next Motion is #11, 10 which is the continuation of Plant Insulation's Motion for An Order Appointing An Examiner On Fiberboard. 12 MR. ESSERMAN: Your Honor, may I be excused --13 THE COURT: Yeah. 14 MR. ESSERMAN: -- from further proceedings? 15 THE COURT: Yeah. Anyone who is not interested in 16 the rest of the agenda is free to leave. Is this Plant 17 Insulation Motion going forward today? 18 MR. PERNICK: I think as far as Plant's concerned it 19 is, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. PERNICK: I do believe that there was a 22 subcommittee set up among the Creditors to deal and 23 investigate the Plant issues, and I think that Miss Parver has 24

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a report that she'd like to make to Your Honor, and a proposal

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732-329-0191

for what to do, but I think that Plant would like it to go forward.

THE COURT: Okay. Then, if we're going to go forward on this issue, may I ask my legal questions first, and then I'll be happy to address any issues. This Motion for the appointment of the examiner is under 1104(c)(s) --

(Pause in proceedings)

THE COURT: -- which states, in essence, that if the Court does not order the appointment of a Trustee under this section, that being section 1104, section 1104(a) says: "at any time after the commencement of the case, but before confirmation of a plan, on a request of a Party-In-Interest of the United States Trustee, and after notice and hearing, the Court shall order the appointment of the Trustee, "etc. Have I ever received a Motion to appoint a Trustee?

MR. PERNICK: You have not received a Motion to appoint a Trustee.

THE COURT: Well then, how do I have to appoint an Examiner? I have never been asked to, nor denied the appointment of a Trustee. So, even if the appointment of an examiner is mandatory under (c)(2), if I don't appoint one under (a), I've never been asked to appoint one under (a). So, I think the issue is not framed appropriately. I don't think the release can be granted, and I think the motion has to be dismissed without prejudice. Anybody here for Plant who

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wants to convince me that I'm in error? Okay, then -- MR. TRAVIS: We're not sure.

(Laughter)

THE COURT: If I have an order that I cannot -- Mr. Pernick can you submit me an order?

MR. PERNICK: Yeah, I think there is somebody here from Plant who wants to address the Court.

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry, I apologize. Yes?

MS. MALONEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Mary
Maloney Huss for Plant, and I'd to introduce my Co-counsel,
Monte Travis of Travis and Pon. He has already been admitted
pro hoc, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MR. TRAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes, on behalf of Plant Insulation, Your Honor, the reason we've brought this motion is because Owens Corning had the motive, and the opportunity, and we believe there are indications that they did improperly use Fiberboard settlement trust moneys to settle Owens Corning asbestos liabilities. And there's no one, at this point, who is either — that has an incentive to find this out, or who is unconflicted with respect to whether they should find this out. And in fact, most of the people seated in this Courtroom today have an incentive not to find this out. Now, I am not aware of any case involving a Motion to appoint an examiner in which the Court found that there was

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732-329-0191

a pre-condition in 1104,

that --

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THE COURT: Well, I ruled that way in an unpublished decision in another case and I think, being consistent with myself, I still that's the correct reading.

MR. TRAVIS: All right, while then you're one case ahead of me, Your Honor.

(Laughter)

THE COURT: It's nice to be consistent with yourself, occasionally.

(Laughter)

MR. TRAVIS: On the other hand, it's also nice sometimes to change one's mind, when it appears to be the right thing to do.

(Laughter)

THE COURT: It is.

MR. TRAVIS: And the examiner provisions of section 1104, of course, were a result of compromise which took out trustee provisions that previously had been part of the bankruptcy law. And again, I haven't read Your Honor's unpublished decision. I also haven't seen any other decisions, published or otherwise, or any suggestion in the commentary to the effect that there must be an application first, a Motion for Trustee --

THE COURT: Well, I know. But how else do you read

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732-329-0191

the rule? I mean, if you look at the Code, the Code specifically says -- and, you know, the argument has been raised by Plant that the language of the statute is clear on its face, it needs essentially no hearing. Well, I agree. I think it is clear on its face, and it says if the Court does not order the appointment of the trustee under this section, which is section 1104, and the only section to provide appointment of the trustee -- well, actually either 11(a) or 11(b) -- but they both require motions, and I have no such motion. Therefore, I don't have to appoint an examiner, and I don't see a ground to appoint an examiner on a mandatory basis, because I have never refused to appoint a trustee, nor has anybody yet presented me with information to show cause of why a trustee should be appointed.

MR. TRAVIS: Your Honor, in that respect, again, I would look at the plain language of the statute. If the Court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section, the Court has not --

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. TRAVIS: -- ordered the appointment of a trustee under this section.

THE COURT: I've never been asked to.

MR. TRAVIS: And --

THE COURT: So I've never refused it.

MR. TRAVIS: -- I don't believe that Section C

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requires, on its face, that there be a prior application or a refusal, merely that it hasn't happened. Because an examiner of course has a different burden, I mean a different task, different role, and it's intended to be something that's far less intrusive than a trustee.

THE COURT: Oh sure. I think you could read the statute to say that in lieu of a trustee that an examiner in some circumstances might be appropriate, as opposed to a trustee. But it seems to me that the only time it's mandatory is if I haven't entered the appointment of a trustee, and I've never been presented with that motion.

MR. TRAVIS: So --

THE COURT: I've never had a chance to either refuse or not refuse.

MR. TRAVIS: All right. Well, I recognize that I'm swimming hopelessly upstream on this one, Your Honor. Procedurally then, Plant still has an interest that it believes is not being protected, and it is a very large interest as far as Plant is concerned. What Your Honor then would require in order to get to the point where we would be able to bring a motion for an examiner is a prior motion for a trustee.

THE COURT: No, I'm sorry. I think you may have the grounds to file a request for an examiner for some other cause. I think the issue is whether I must, whether I am

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752-329-0191

compelled, to appoint an examiner on your motion because there is no trustee in the case. And I do not think that the law requires me to do that when I have never been presented with a request to appoint a trustee in a case, and have never looked at the issue of whether a trustee, or a trustee with limited powers, or an examiner in lieu of a trustee, is appropriate in a case. So, you may have grounds to request an examiner. The issue is, am I mandatorily required to appoint one? And I think the answer is, under the circumstances facing me here, I'm not.

MR. TRAVIS: All right. And if instead, we now move for the appointment of a trustee in conjunction with an alternative motion for an examiner, would that then present the situation for the Court properly, as the Court reads that statute?

THE COURT: Well, your grounds for appointment of the trustee have to be pretty intense.

MR. TRAVIS: Right. But if we lost that, is that the foundational -- is that the foundation that Your Honor's --

THE COURT: That's the foundation that is required for me to have a mandatory requirement to appoint a trustee. Now, I recognize the fallacy in this reasoning, because if I deny the appointment of the trustee, it's probably because I don't think you have grounds to appoint a trustee, and therefore, then I'm back into this examiner if you ask for

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792-320-0191

that relief as an alternative. But, you know, it may very well be at that point that there is some mandatory reasoning. I don't think the statute is as clear as Plant believes it to be for the reasons I'm explaining now. But, yes, that would be my understanding of the foundational underpinning.

MR. TRAVIS: All right. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, I think at this point, this motion is either -- on a mandatory grounds, should be denied without prejudice. If you have some other grounds that you want to articulate on a non-mandatory discretionary basis, then I think you always have the right to make that request.

MR. TRAVIS: All right. Well, so far our motion has been couched in terms of the mandatory grounds, and we have not placed it in terms of the discretionary. So, we will take another look at it, Your Honor, because this is something we feel very strongly has not been yet protected by the constellation of parties currently before the Court.

THE COURT: Okay. Has Plant taken advantage of the opportunity I provided to get into the intercreditor issues?

MR. TRAVIS: Well, this is very interesting, because I saw in the status report from, I believe it was from the Debtors, saying well, Plant never called, Plant had the opportunity, we set up a subcommittee on December 21st, and so on. I think they have our phone number. I think they could have called us and said, "Hey, we're having a big meeting

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about your motion, do you want to come?" And nobody did. And we would be happy to take advantage of that. However, the intercreditor issues — although a lot of the documents, I understand, are being developed as part of that — may be relevant to what we think an examiner needs to do, and therefore could make the appointment of an examiner both cheaper and easier; that is, make the examiner's job cheaper and easier.

It really arises from different concerns, concerns that the banks had about guarantees given them by subsidiaries who supposedly are not subject to asbestos claims and bondholder claims, and so on. It doesn't really respond to our concern that Fiberboard's Selma Trust, in effect, was purchased by Owens Corning so they could use that in their nationwide settlement program, or any other settlement program they pursued, to help defer Owens Corning's asbestos liabilities. And we had requested the U.S. Trustee to appoint a separate Creditor's Committee for Fiberboard, and the U.S. Trustee didn't think that that was the right thing to do at that time, and we've been active on this issue, and I guess we intend to continue to be active, and we certainly will avail ourselves of whatever opportunity is going to be presented to us to participate with respect to that. And I was not aware of this meeting in December.

THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Pernick, to the

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732-920-0191

extent that Plant would like to participate, please provide notice of when the documents are available, so that --

MR PERNICK: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- they can look at the documents.

MR. PERNICK: -- that's never been a problem. Let's be clear about what happened. When we were in Court, I don't remember when it was, October or November on the original motion, Plant understood what the process was. We said we were going to get those documents together, and we offered basically for them to participate. I think it's a nice argument to say we should call them at every step of the way, but frankly, I'm not going to beg them to come get information to look into this claim.

We're very comfortable with the subcommittee which the Debtor has stayed out of, except to supply information and answer questions. We don't know what they're doing. We got a little bit of a report that was a public — a whole group report last week about where they were. But we haven't been participating in that, and if Plant has questions, all they have to do is ask. So to push it back on us, and say, "You know, should have asked us whether we had any questions," that's garbage. I mean, you know, I don't — I'm sorry for characterizing it that way, but it's a little disingenuous.

MR. TRAVIS: Well, I don't think we need to burden the record with this discussion, Your Honor. I think we can

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 probably talk about this and set the garbage aside, prospectively.

MR. PERNICK: If they want information and document statements, I think Miss Parver's going to give you a little report on what they've done to date, and what they're doing. All they have to do is contact her, and they can get whatever they want.

THE COURT: Okay. Then, Plant is aware of the fact at this point that you can contact Miss Parver and get documents that you're interested in looking at with respect to the transfer that you're alleging. I will enter an order that denies this motion for appointment of an examiner without prejudice, when it's submitted to me within a week by the Debtor. Okay.

MR. TRAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Miss Parver?

MS. PARVER: Yes, Your Honor. I guess I'm supposed to give you a report.

(Laughter)

MS. PARVER: Your Honor, there has been a subcommittee of the Futures representative and the Unsecured Creditor's Committee to look into all of the allegations raised by the Plant motion. Frankly, they're very relevant, not only to the intercreditor, but as well to issues of the Future representative, because we are the Future

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representative for Future claimants rising from any Fiberboard asbestos liability as well.

In that regard, Your Honor, we have interviewed the lawyers from the Debevoise, Plimpton firm who negotiated many of the NSP agreements, going into the basis on how they were negotiated, etc. We have asked for and received voluminous documents as well as the Debtor's analysis of how they would -- the allegations of Plant. We've interviewed the leading lawyer from the Brobeck, who was with the Brobeck firm, who represented Fiberboard pre-acquisition by Owens Corning, and subsequent to the acquisition by Owens Corning negotiated many of the NSP agreements for Fiberboard with respect to the same allegations from Plant. We have further interviews to be conducted with respect to the interim trustee and the present trustee of the Fiberboard Trust. We're still awaiting a lot of documents, and we have additional requests for information in terms of disbursements and the financial accounting for the trust.

And in addition, Your Honor, we have been speaking, both the Unsecured Creditor's Committee and we as well, with our asbestos claims experts, Your Honor, because in many respects, the process that they will be going through in terms of arriving at estimations of asbestos claims will be looking at the settlement histories, the tort histories, of both of these companies, and as a matter of timing, they'll be looking at it

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from pre-acquisition of Fiberboard imposed acquisition, so they can do subsequent analyses, Your Honor, which will also give the Court, if you will, a mathematical or a very objective estimate or calculation with respect to how liability was apportioned.

THE COURT: All right. Is there any reason why Plant has raised this issue and is concerned with the outcome that, especially in lieu of looking at an examiner motion or a trustee motion again, Plant can't benefit from the work that's been done?

MS. PARVER: Your Honor, I don't see why they -- I assume there are -- they will be entering into the same kind of confidentiality agreements and orders.

THE COURT: Yes, they'd have to have a confidentiality agreement.

MS. PARVER: And right now, obviously our communications with our own experts and the Unsecured's communications with theirs are still separate. But apart from that, Your Honor, I don't see myself, a problem with making a lot of this information available in relevant documents, and they should contact me.

THE COURT: Okay. Plant's counsel so hears. Mr. Travis, you heard. Okay.

MR. TRAVIS: I heard, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else by way a status

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report with respect to that portion of the Intercreditor

Agreement? Do we want to get into the rest of that issue now,
or later?

MR. PERNICK: I think if I can, there's a few more things that we can get through quickly, and we'll --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PERNICK: -- give the Intercreditor. The next one would be #13, which is the Debtor's 7th motion for an order under 365(a) authorizing the Debtors to reject miscellaneous contracts and unexpired leases, and it's with respect to the Caterpillar objection. And we've actually got a Proposed Form of Order that's been agreed to by Caterpillar. I think I -- let me see if I have a red line, I'm not sure. Yes, I do. It just, it says, that "provided, however, that the leases and contacts with Caterpillar shall be deemed rejected as of the date the Debtor surrenders possession of the equipment subject to the Caterpillar leases, the Debtors and Caterpillar shall provide one another all reasonable cooperation, so that the Caterpillar equipment is surrendered to Caterpillar as soon as reasonably possible."

On Paragraph #3, on the rejection, on the date for claims subject to the rejection, "Caterpillar has 30 days from the date the Debtors surrender," obviously because that date's going to be later than today, "the Caterpillar equipment to file their claim, and the Court retains jurisdiction to hear

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and determine any disputes arising under the order."

THE COURT: Okay. With respect to those agenda items 12 and 13, I -- yes, I have a problem with this. I'm going to enter these orders this time because you've resolved it. But I really do expect the parties to stick to no extensions beyond the calendar week before my hearings, because I cannot get ready for them. I will enter these orders today. I will not do it again. They will be automatically pushed over to the next agenda.

MR. PERNICK: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay, anybody here for Caterpillar who wishes to be heard? All right, I'll take your order Mr.

Pernick, if you --

MR. PERNICK: Okay.

(Pause in the proceedings)

MR. PERNICK: Item #14, Your Honor, and I apologize for it getting resolved late this time, but it was actually a lot more complicated, and obviously going forward, we will adhere to the one-week ahead. But this was the Debtor's motion pursuant to sections 105, 363 for authority to transfer pursuant to an Asset Purchase Agreement of Shielding Solution Assets, and there were three objections: MGM Consumer Products, Credit Suisse-First Boston, and Andrew Woodside. And all three of those objections have been resolved. I've actually got to bench file the Notice of Withdrawal from Mr.

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Woodside, because he's pro se, and obviously when we were resolved it, we told him he didn't need to come out. We did tell him he could be available by phone with the Court if he 3 wanted to, and I think he chose not to do that, but --4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. PERNICK: -- I have his original signed 6 withdrawal for the Court. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 8 MR. PERNICK: And I have a blacklined, if I can 9 approach, I'll give you the duplicate and the original order 10 and then a blacklined order, and then if you want, I can walk 11 you though what those changes were. 12 THE COURT: All right. Just one second, please. 13 (Pause in the proceedings) 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. PERNICK: Did I give you a blacklined copy, Your 16 Honor? 17 THE COURT: No, you didn't. 18 MR. PERNICK: Let me do that, because it would be 19 easier for you to follow. 20 THE COURT: Can I just read it quickly? 21 MR. PERNICK: Sure. 22 THE COURT: It might take less time to read the 23 order. 24

> Writer's Cramp, Inc. Certified Court Transcribers 732-329-0191

MR. PERNICK: Sure. If you look in paragraphs three

and four while you're reading it, those are the major changes. THE COURT: All right. Have the parties seen this? 2 MR. PERNICK: Yes. I just passed around another copy 3 so everybody could see it and make sure, but we did circulate 4 it before the hearing. 5 (Pause in the proceedings) 6 THE COURT: Anyone wish to be heard on the changes in 7 this order? 8 MR. BOUGHTON: Your Honor, good afternoon, Bill 9 Boughton for MGM. I just wanted to alert Your Honor that the 10 changes to the Form of Order resolve MGM's limited objection. 11 We're happy to have it withdrawn. Thank you. 12 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Good afternoon. 13 MR. ECKSTEIN: Your Honor, Kenneth Eckstein, Kramer, 14 Levin, on behalf of CSFB as agent for the banks. Your Honor, 15 we had raised several issues, I think connected with this 16 motion. We had raised similar issues in connection with 17 prior motions. We're satisfied that the purposes of this 18 motion paragraph three, preserves the banks' rights, and I 19 think is adequate for purposes of entering the order.

THE COURT: Okay. Okay. That order is signed.

MR. PERNICK: If I could trouble the Court for the duplicate original of that, because --

THE COURT: Here.

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MR PERNICK: -- I think the purchaser's in the

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Courtroom.

(Pause in proceedings)

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERNICK: The next one is #15, which is the hearing on the Debtor's request for preliminary injunction. You might recall that there is a standstill agreement that was entered into, but Standard Chartered Bank Societe Generale and KBC Bank were not part of that. They had a separate agreement. And as to them, the TRO, I believe, expires tomorrow. So this is a stipulation in order with us and those banks. Further extending the TRO, it runs through April 22nd at 5:00 p.m.

The reason for that, Your Honor, is simple. There are negotiations going on to resolve those claims. They mostly deal with loans or related to loans with non-filing foreign joint-ventures that Debtor is in, and there work-outs to be done in each of those joint ventures, and they're complicated. But they have been proceeding, and there are discussions that continue, so those banks have agreed to continue with the TRO while those discussions take place.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have an order?
MR. PERNICK: Yes.

(Pause in proceedings)

THE COURT: Here you are, Mr. Pernick.

MR. PERNICK: Thank you. That leaves us with 16,

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which is the intercreditor status report; 12, which is the exclusivity motion, and then one quick one, which I can get out of the way, #17, which was the status report on the fee examiner. As you probably recall, the Court asked us to look into that and make a proposal. We did get actually a very excellent suggestion from Mr. Esserman. A gentleman, Warren Smith, who has been the fee examiner on a number of Delaware cases, and he sent me a proposal, and I anticipate that we'll provide the Court with a proposal either to retain him or some other party before the next hearing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERNICK: But I did send that around to everybody in the Courtroom. I haven't received any objections to him yet, and I'll just make sure that we're okay with the arrangement. We have to talk to him about the fee, because in some of the other cases, he's gotten a percentage --

(Laughter)

MR. PERNICK: -- of the gross fees reviewed, and in this case, I guess the good news for him is that it's a large set of fees each year. I don't think we want to go that high, so we're going to talk to him about it. It'll probably be some kind of sliding scale that makes it a more reasonable number.

THE COURT: Okay. He has recently been appointed as the fee examiner in the Grace Case as well. And I guess,

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since I don't use fee examiners very often, I didn't make what use of him I thought my be appropriate clear in Grace.

MR. PERNICK: Right.

THE COURT: And he was asking whether he could talk to me about that. I thought it might be better if he came to Court, and we all resolved that issue. So, in the Grace Case, I was about ready to enter an administrative order that writes things into the same types of categories that we're using in this case, because it makes my own review much easier. Mr. Smith apparently doesn't think that's necessary from his point of view. In fact, it may make things more complicated, rather than less. I think you need to raise this issue with him, Mr.Pernick --

MR. PERNICK: Okay.

THE COURT: -- to see what's going to work best. I do not want to increase fees simply to review fees.

MR. PERNICK: Right.

THE COURT: That isn't the point. It's just that it's getting very difficult to get through all these fee apps in all these big cases, and I simply need help.

MR. PERNICK: Sure.

THE COURT: If he wants to come to Court and raise whatever issues so we all can work it out, I'm happy to do that, but I really do not prefer to have a private discussion

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MR. PERNICK: Okay.

THE COURT: -- along those lines.

MR. PERNICK: Okay. I will talk to him about that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PERNICK: And we'll come to the Court with a

proposal either from him or from somebody else.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PERNICK: All right. I'm going to turn it over now to Mr. Monk for the status report on the intercreditor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

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MR. MONK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Charles Monk from Saul, Ewing in behalf of the Debtors. Your Honor, obviously, we submitted a written status report in advance and I apologize. I know that the Court has lots to do, and I realize that it arrived very late, and I won't repeat the

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matters in the written status report, because I'm certain the

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Court has read it and given it some thought. Let me do a review, and then I'll be happy to answer any questions the

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Court may have, and I'll make a recommendation from the

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Debtors.

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additional information production. We've had -- our schedule

The overview is that we have been proceeding with

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has worked out so we've had about one meeting a month, usually

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in advance of the omnibus hearing, in which we can sort of report on the status of information requests that have been

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made in the preceding period. The parties are basically down to letter requests and then the Debtor or other parties responding to those letter requests. And that process seems to be working, I think, well by all accounts.

At our last meeting, we had some very frank and, as you can see from the list of issues, pretty substantive discussion about issues that the parties were beginning to glean from their factual review. We think that that discussion — these meetings last anywhere from two and a half to three hours. Much longer than that, I think, sort of gets into diminishing returns. So that's sort of been the timeframe that I've been operating on, as, if you will, the major dumbo of this process. I think the process is working quite well, and I'd like to see it continue.

We have some work to do with third party sources of information, although we've actually made some progress on that front. We've been informed by the underwriters that they will turn their documents over for us to review, and we're -- we still have to work out how we get copies of those documents, but I can also report that in an order entered on Friday of last week, the Court in Boston set a hearing date of March the -- I think the 13th -- but in that week in March -- for a possible hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, which was the one basis that the underwriters and the parties in that case were asking us to hold off on production there.

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I'm sure there are other issues that the parties will bring forward. These are the ones that we have discussed so far, and I don't mean to suggest that these are —that those discussions are in any way complete. I was happy that we could identify the issues and get agreement that those subjects are generally the subjects that we think require further investigation. The banks have come forward and made a strong recommendation that we initiate a litigation posture, and I — in their statement, that I'm sure the Court has read, they are encouraging the parties to think about this in terms of proceeding with valuation hearings, or valuation litigation procedures. It's interesting that they would have the Debtors initiate that process, which I think is — the Debtors are not interested in doing in any way.

We think this negotiation posture is the way to go. The parties have been -- frankly, at the very first meeting there was a general agreement among the parties that these discussions were for purposes of settlement, that the discussions were therefore protected from further use, that the parties could then have some assurance that they could be candid in their discussions, as lawyers sit down and across the table. We think if you put this in a litigation posture at this point in time, the benefits of those discussions will go out the window, issues will -- that it may be possible to persuade a litigant might not be worthy of their pursuing,

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might suddenly pop to the fore as, if we're going to fight this in litigation, every issue that people have is going to come up and be put on the table.

The Debtors believe that the next -- the way to move the process along, the next affirmative thing we can do is to present on a schedule, which we propose, factual stipulations that try to clear away the underbrush of some of these issues which are heavily ensconced in accounting facts. Let me give you an example there. We have, for instance, the whole question of the Owens Corning Fiberglass Technology License Agreement, and the Court will remember -- I'll just do a little background facts here -- that Owens Corning in 1991 entered into a contract with an new entity it created called Owens Corning Fiberglass Technology, by which Owens Corning transferred its domestic intellectual property then in its possession to Owens Corning Fiberglass Technology, and licensed that technology back from OCFT.

The reason for that is clearly because there were certain tax strategies that Owens Corning could take advantage of that would assist it in managing its state income tax liabilities. I don't think there's any real -- very much debate about that subject. That process involved paying royalties to OFCT, and in return, OFCT immediately loaning that money back to Owens Corning under a revolving credit agreement that was entered into at the same time the licensing agreement was entered

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into. That agreement was pretty much in place -- there were a few factual developments in connection with it -- but that's basically the arrangement for the past 10 years, and it's a 20 year agreement.

When the Debtors first began to focus on this agreement, and think about the implications of that agreement in connection with this bankruptcy, we frankly brought it to the attention of the banks and other Creditors. And we said, "you know what we've learned about this arrangement we have with OCFT? We think it has implications here. We think it is going to require some fairly thorough factual development for everyone to understand about these issues. We recognized at the same time that there was an enormous possibility that the partes could go spinning off on litigation involving these issues, and it was our objective to avoid that litigation, to get people talking, but at the same time understanding that they needed a lot facts, so they would feel comfortable in discussing those issues and reaching agreements regarding the values that would be represented by the claims against OCFT, and who had the rights to those claims.

There are other Debtor entities that face -- that have similar issues associated with it, OCFT being the one that's most prominent in our discussion, but certainly Integrex, and Fiberboard, and IPM, which is the holding company for many of Owens Corning's foreign entities, and was set up for similar

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tax strategies -- this is another entity that will have a significant amount of facts that need to be pulled together. A lot of those issues are not -- I have taken accountants' depositions before, Your Honor, and frankly, that -- they're very -- not -- that's -- lawyers, you know, I think went to law school because math wasn't their thing, and -- (Laughter)

THE COURT: I should advise you in the interest of fair disclosure, that I'm married to a CPA Mr. Monk -- (Laughter)

MR. MONK: Well, Your Honor, what -- what I was going to say --

THE COURT: -- so I perfectly well understand. (Laughter)

MR. MONK: Well, I think it makes some sense to try for the Debtor, if the Debtor takes the lead and uses the majesty of the Debtor's responsibility here as the basis for our actions, the Debtor takes the lead, and tries to pull together a factual stipulation that would deal with the accounting issues in some sort of rational way, rather than spend lots and lots of time with lawyers interviewing accountants and lots of conversations that don't seem to link up. We think that advances the ball. We think that helps the parties understand where their rights may be, and we think that that will move the process forward.

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